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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
BRIAN EDWARD MAGUIRE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
13386 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal brought by the appellant Brian 
Edward Maguire from a judgment rendered in the Dis-
trict Court of the Third Judicial District of Utah, the 
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, finding appellant Maguire 
guilty of murder in the second degree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant Brian Edward Maguire was charged 
with the crime of murder in the first degree and appeared 
before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, where said ap-
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pellant moved for a trial without jury. The motion was 
granted and appeUant Maguire was found guilty of 
murder in the second degree and was committed to the 
Utah State Prison for a term of ten years to life. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent respectfully seeks affirmation of the trial 
court, finding the appellant Maguire guilty of murder in 
the second degree, and denying appellant's request for a 
new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent agrees with the facts set forth in 
appellant's brief with the following additions or correc-
tions: 
1) The altercation on the evening of October 29, 
1972, concerned itself with an argument between the 
appellant Brian Maguire and Peter Petersen in Peter-
sen's home about Maguire "messing around" with Peter-
sen's girlfriends (R. 240-245). The appellant later took 
Mr. Petersen's girlfriend, Sheryl, to the apartment of 
Mr. Petersen's wife, Susan Nelson. Because the appellant 
so acted, Mr. Petersen found Mr. Maguire and Sheryl 
at the apartment (R. 174), cuffed the appellant (R. 187) 
and slapped Sheryl (R. 187). The appellant and Peter-
sen then exited to the parking lot after which Mr. Peter-
sen returned and said to his wife that Maguire had a 
.38 caliber gun, but that he wasn^t scared (R. 188). 
2) The appellant testified that soon after leaving 
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the motel he had trouble with his automobile lights and 
that Mr. Petersen stopped, offered assistance, and asked 
the appellant if he wanted a lift home (R. 254-256). 
3) Maguire testified that upon arriving at an alley-
way he refused to get out of the car after Mr. Petersen 
told him to do so (R. 260-262). Appellant continued to 
refuse to get out of the car even though he testified that 
he had always retreated from Mr. Petersen before (R. 
319-320). 
4) Mr. Maguire testified that his memory was 
somewhat hazy but indicated in his testimony that he 
snapped out of his "condition" (R. 313) to remember 
the incidents leading to the shooting. He further testified 
that he could not recall Mr. Petersen reaching to the 
glove compartment for the gun even though he would 
have had to reach over the appellant to get it (R. 135). 
5) Appellant Maguire admitted lunging for the gun 
after which it went off (R. 262), but nothing was said 
as to it causing injury. Mr. Petersen's left hand was ad-
mittedly on the left side of the steering wheel at the time 
appellant lunged for the gun. Mr. Maguire testified that 
Mr. Petersen then lunged at him and the gun went off 
and hit the deceased in the forehead (R. 263). Dr. Tay-
lor testified that two bullets entered the head, one in the 
forehead and one entering the rear of the head (R. 137). 
Either bullet would have caused instant unconsciousness 
(R. 137). Mr. Maguire testified about only the bullet in 
the forehead. 
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6) At trial, the appellant moved to waive trial by 
jury (R. 61). Discussion ensued with the appellant as 
to his understanding of that request after which the 
motion was granted (R. 51, T. 62). Later in the pro-
ceedings after the prosecution rested, the court ruled 
that first degree murder would not be considered and 
that second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter 
would be the only two possibilities (R. 214). 
7) The lower court found that sufficient evidence 
existed for the malice aforethought needed for second 
degree murder and ordered that Mr. Maguire be im-
prisoned in the Utah State Prison for ten years to life. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AL-
LOWING THE APPELLANT TO WAIVE 
TRIAL BY JURY IN THE CASE AT BAR. 
A. 
THE COURT'S RULING IN A PREVIOUS 
CASE OF MURDER IN THE FIRST DE-
GREE WHERE THE JUDGE AND DE-
FENSE ATTORNEY WERE THE SAME 
AND UPON WHICH THE DEFENSE AT-
TORNEY APPARENTLY RELIED, GOV-
ERNED THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
CASE AT BAR EXCLUDING ALL POSSI-
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BILITY THAT THE DEATH PENALTY 
COULD BE IMPOSED. 
Appellant Maguire relies upon Utah Code Ann. § 
77-27-2 (1953), in support of his argument that he could 
not waive jury trial in the present case. The pertinent 
language of the statute is as follows: 
"Issues of fact must be tried by a jury, but 
in all cases except where a sentence of death 
may be imposed, trial by jury may be waived by 
the defendant. Such waiver shall be made in 
open court and entered in the minutes." (Em-
phasis added.) 
A cursory reading of this language makes it appear 
that in every capital case a trial by jury is an absolute 
which cannot be waived. Respondent contends, however, 
that the standard so claimed is not absolute, but hinges 
solely on the determination whether the "death penalty" 
may be imposed. 
Since the United States Supreme Court rendered its 
decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 
2726, 33 L, Ed. 2d 346 (1972), the status of the death 
penalty has been relatively uncertain in Utah as well 
as throughout the United States. Despite this fact, 
effects of Furman on the present case need only be ex-
amined lightly, since respondent submits that the death 
penalty did not apply to his particular case, and since 
it did not, the alleged "absolute" standard of Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-27-2, supra, did not apply. 
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In State of Utah v. Donald Leith Christean and 
Vernon Wayne Rogers, Case No. 13510, presently pend-
ing before this Court, Judge Baldwin ruled on March 
12, 1973, on the opening day of trial, that Utah's death 
penalty was unconstitutional and that it could not be 
applied. Mr. Gil Athay of the Legal Defender's Associa-
tion was the defense attorney in that action and had 
previously requested Judge Baldwin to make a ruling 
on that issue. 
In the present case, Mr. Gil Athay, once again was 
the attorney before Judge Baldwin. Following the same 
procedure he used in the Christean case, Mr. Athay 
moved for the jury to be waived. This motion was made 
on April 30, 1973, just six weeks after Judge Baldwin's 
previous ruling in the Christean case. Again, Mr. Athay's 
motion was granted. 
Whether Judge Baldwin misconstrued Furman in 
the previous case is not paramount. What is important 
is the fact that the judge ruled that the "law of the case" 
was that the death penalty would not be imposed. Like-
wise, in the present case, Judge Baldwin allowed the 
defendant to waive a trial by jury. It was not necessary 
for Mr. Athay to obtain another ruling regarding Utah's 
death penalty because Mr. Athay was fully aware of the 
Judge's ruling in the Christean case. The ruling made 
in the previous case became the law of that court and as 
such continued to control all subsequent situations of 
like nature coming before the judge since the judge never 
specifically ruled otherwise. 
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Since Mr. Athay undoubtedly conversed with his 
client regarding Judge Baldwin's previous ruling in the 
Christean case and knew perfectly well that the court 
would so rule again if called upon, the appellant cannot 
now claim that irreparable damage was done. It is diffi-
cult to see how the appellant can claim prejudice when 
before the defense presented its case the court ruled that 
only second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter 
would be considered, and that the charge of first degree 
murder was dismissed. Furthermore, all parties knew 
that the court would not apply the death penalty. This 
was known prior to the commencement of and during 
the trial. The transcript, as well as all circumstances 
surrounding the trial make this point clear. Despite 
this, appellant Maguire was not even convicted of that 
for which he claims prejudice, but was instead convicted 
of a lesser charge. Thus, no prejudice took place, and 
appellant Maguire was given the benefit of the doubt 
in dropping of the charge of first degree murder by the 
Court. 
Appellant Maguire cites State v. James, 30 Utah 
2d 32, 512 P. 2d 1031 (1973), and Roll v. Larsen, 30 Utah 
2d 271, 516 P. 2d 1392 (1973), in support of his position 
that a jury trial in his case could not be waived. Neither 
case is on point. A careful reading of James and Roll 
indicates that the court merely held that "capital" cases 
still exist in Utah. The entire opinions center around 
discussions of the "classification" theory of offenses and 
how that theory stands in light of Furman. Respondent 
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concedes and agrees with the court's opinions in James 
and Roll that certain offenses are still capital in nature. 
The Court said in James: 
"The Constitution of the state has provided 
a system of classifying certain serious offenses 
as capital cases and then mandated a specific 
procedural structure for the administration of 
justice based on that classification. Furman v. 
Georgia cannot be rationally construed as abro-
gating our fundamental law." 
The procedural structure referred to is that defen-
dants may waive a jury trial in all cases except where 
the death penalty may be imposed. Therefore, in capital 
cases where a death penalty may be a reality, one must 
be tried by a jury of twelve. In the present case, how-
ever, it was the "law of the case" that the death penalty 
could not be imposed, thus allowing a waiver of jury trial, 
which means a waiver of the twelve man jury as pre-
scribed by James. See Straka v. Voyles, 69 Utah 123, 
252 P. 2d 677 (1929), which discusses the concept of 
"law of the case." Thus, it must be concluded that capi-
tal offenses still exist in Utah, but that the waiver of the 
jury trial in the instant case was and is not governed by 
the James and Roll cases as asserted by the appellant. 
The respondent therefore submits that no prejudice 
exists which would demand the reversal for a new trial. 
The understanding of all parties involved made the possi-
bility of the death penalty a nullity and the court further 
eliminated the possibility of a conviction for first degree 
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murder. Therefore, the trial court's findings should be 
sustained, 
B. 
JURY TRIAL IS WAIVABLE BY DEFEN-
DANTS IN CAPITAL CASES, AND UTAH 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND S T A T U T O R Y 
LANGUAGE IS NO BAR THERETO. 
Though a first reading of Utah constitutional and 
statutory provisions appear to indicate otherwise, there 
is sitrong reason to allow waiver of jury trials in those 
cases raised by appellant. Absolute standards can be 
detrimental to those whom they are designed to protect. 
Flexibility must exist to prevent undue prejudice if the 
defendants in particular instances feel such would take 
place. 
"Supposed fairness" is the argument used to estab-
lish the sanctity of a jury trial — especially in capital 
cases. This philosophy of fairness is deeply rooted in the 
common law. Such background led to Utah's enactment 
of Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2 on which appellant's argu-
ments are based. Basically, this protection was used to 
protect individuals from the tyranny of the state. To-
day's "Due Process" procedures make available to an 
accused the protections upon which the jury trial system 
was based. The standards now insure that protections 
will be afforded and followed — the courts being the 
determiner of their effectiveness. The langauge empha-
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sized by the appellant is merely a verbal expression 
pointing out the importance of keeping the right to jury 
trial a reality. This simply means that such a right can-
not be destroyed or ignored and that such a right shall 
always exist. 
Art. I, § 10 of the Utah Constitution says: 
"In capital cases, the right of trial by jury 
remain inviolate" (Emphasis added.) 
"Inviolate" has been defined in jurisdictions such 
as Washington, State v. Furth, 5 Wash, 2d 1, 104 P. 2d 
925 (1940), to mean that the right cannot be "impaired" 
or "abridged" in any way, but must always exist. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-27-2 takes this language and attempts to 
make the standard absolute. In other words, the statute 
attempits to make jury trials absolute in certain instances 
even though the Constitution does not go that far. The 
propriety of attempting to expand the constitutional 
lanugauge without constitutional amendment is clearly 
questionable. The Constitution merely provides that 
the right is absolute, but does not state that the appli-
cation of that right is absolute or that the right can; 
never be waived. 
Respondent contends that many circumstances can 
arise where an accused charged with murder in the first 
degree would desire to waive a jury trial. The article 
"Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases," 25 Michi-
gan Law Review 695 (1927), lists what could be con-
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sidered a few of the reasons. The list contain the follow-
ing: 
1) The charge is af a revolting nature. 
2) The entire state or community is aroused. 
3) The past record of accused is bad. 
4) Public sentiment might influence jury. 
5) Great deal of publicity before trial. 
6) It is a prosecution involving race. 
7) Judges' greater experience can be valu-
able to the accused. 
8) Feeling that the jury will convict on gen-
eral principles instead of evidence. 
9) Confidence in fairer trial by judiciary. 
10) Reluctance to go to trial on complicated 
issues. 
11) A desire to avoid the cumbersomeness and 
delay of a jury trial. 
Certainly, these eleven reasons are not all inclusive, 
but they $how that an absolute standard could work as 
a detriment in specific instances. It is obvious that in 
many cases it may be advantageous to have a trial by 
a judge without a jury — to deny such a choice might 
in itself deny the accused the right to a fair trial and 
make the jury an instrument of oppression rather than 
a means of "fair protection." 
The Ohio Supreme Court held many years ago in 
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Hoffman v. State, 98 Ohio St. 137, 120 N. E. 234 (1918), 
that: 
"Clearly this right [of jury trial] is for the 
benefit of the accused. If he regards it in the 
particular case as a burden, a hardship, a preju-
dice to a fair trial, why in the name of reason 
should he not be permitted to waive it and sub-
mit his cause to the magistrate . . . What was 
given to him generally as a shield should not 
be used as a sword in case he feels that a jury 
trial in such a case would so result." 
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that ciroum-
stances exist in which a jury trial may be waived without 
ever trying the case to establish the facts. The court has 
openly acknowledged through its decisions that the plea 
of guilty, made in open court, takes the place of trial 
and verdict. Thus, if an accused in a first degree murder 
case enters a plea of guilty it is clear that he effectively 
waives jury trial even though the offense may be punish-
able by death. 
In State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 171 P. 2d 383 
(1946), the Utah Supreme Count established that a plea 
of guilty dispenses with the jury because the plea is the 
same as if a jury had found the accused guilty. The 
court said: 
"He contends that the evidence shows that 
he pleaded guilty as a matter of convenience, 
and that a plea of guilty does not amount to a 
conviction, Such novel argument is specious. 
Unless timely withdrawn, a plea of guilty places 
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a defendant in the same position as a verdict of 
a jury finding him guilty of the charge after 
a fair and impartial trial. A plea of guilty is a 
confession of the correctness of the accusation 
which dispenses with the necessity of proof 
thereof." 
This holding was recently reaffirmed in Coombs v. Tur-
ner, 25 Utah 2d 397, 383 P. 2d 437 (1971), when the 
court said: 
"A plea of guilty dispenses with the neces-
sity of proof, and the issue of innocence or guilt 
cannot here be relitigated any more than it could 
be alter a jury verdict of guilty." 
Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 50 S. Ct. 
253, 74 L. Ed. 854 (1930), involved the interpretation 
of Art. I l l , § 2, paragraph 3 of the United States Consti-
tution requiring jury trial in all criminal cases. In re-
jecting this absolute standard and language the Court 
stated: 
"In the light of the foregoing it is reason-
able to conclude that the framers of the Consti-
tution simply were intent upon preserving the 
right of trial by jury primarily for the protection 
of the accused . . . 
Upon this view of the constitutional provi-
sions we conclude that article 3, § 2, is not juris-
dictional, but was meant to confer a right upon 
the accused which he may forego at his election, 
to deny his power to do so is to convert a privi-
lege into an imperative requirement . . . 
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After an extensive review of the authorities 
and a discussion of the question on principle, the 
court concluded that, since it was permissible 
for an accused person to plead guilty and thus 
waive any trial, he must necessarily be able to 
waive a jury trial." . . . 
See also Mason v. United States, 250 F. 2d 705 (10th 
Or. 1957). 
In light of the foregoing authority, it seems unrea-
sonable to permit an accused to dispense with every 
stage of trial by a plea of guilty, and yet forbid him to 
dispense with a particular form of trial (trial by jury) 
by consent or waiver. These inconsistencies must give 
way to the better reasoned rule that the right to trial 
by jury — even in light of the statutory language of 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2 — is not absolute but must 
depend on circumstances in each particular case. Such 
a waiver is not contrary to sound conceptions of fairness 
or public policy. If, for instance, the court rules that the 
death penalty will not apply in a particular case, then 
it is not error for the accused to waive the jury. 
The law permits venue to insure a fair trial, or to 
allow the accused the best position. Why then, if an 
individual honestly feels he would be judged more fairly 
by a judge sitting without a jury should we force him to 
have his case heard by a jury? This type of force runs 
counter to Utah's as well as the United States' concep-
tion of justice. 
New York had no difficulty in realizing that this 
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force should not be used. Art. I, § 2 of the New York 
Constitution is as explicit as Utah's statute and yet, 
the Court allowed waiver. The pertinent language of the 
New York Constitution is as follows: 
"Trial by jury in all cases in which it has 
heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional 
provision shall remain inviolate forever * * * 
A jury trial may be waived by the defendant 
in all criminal cases, except those in which the 
crime charged may be punishable by death, by a 
written instrument signed by the defendant in 
person in open court before and with the ap-
proval of a judge or justice of a court having 
jurisdiction to try the offense." 
This constitutional provision was interpreted by the 
New York Court in People v. Duchin, 12 N. Y. 2d 351, 
190 N. E. 2d 17 (1963), where an individual charged with 
rape in the first degree, assault in the second degree, 
carnal abuse of a child . . ., waived jury trial and later 
challenged that waiver on appeal. The court held that 
the jury trial may be waived in all cases despite the 
language of the constitution. The majority held that if 
an intelligent and knowing waiver is made, the jury may 
be waived. The court said: 
"The provision is designed for the benefit 
of the defendant. When, choosing to be tried 
by a judge alone he requests a waiver, he is en-
titled to it as a matter of right once it appears 
to the satisfaction of the judge of the court hav-
ing jurisdiction that, first, the waiver is tendered 
in good faith and is not a stratagem to procure 
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an otherwise impermissible procedural advantage 
— . . . and, second, that the defendant is fully 
aware of the consequences of the choice he is 
making." 
Further, Article 12 of the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion contains the following language regarding jury trials: 
"And the legislature shall not make any law 
that shall subject any person to a capital or in-
famous punishment . . . without trial by jury." 
In interpreting this language, the Massachusetts Court 
held in Commonwealth v. Rowe, 153 N. E. 537 (Mass, 
1926), that: 
"We find nothing in the words of our Con-
stitution which declares or manifests an inten-
tion to deprive the individual of power to refuse 
to assert his constitutional right to trial by jury." 
Thus, it can be clearly seen that there is support 
to the proposition that an individual can waive jury trial 
in capital offenses such as the one at bar. 
It is further established that nearly all rights granted 
by the United States Constitution may be waived. The 
only ones which appear to conflict with such a statement 
are "due process" or "equal protection" rights which 
themselves are made up of the other waivable rights — 
such as trial by jury. 
The United States Supreme Court has accepted the 
philosophy and subsequently established it by holding 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
that "knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional 
guarantees is only needed for those guarantees affecting 
due process." Scheckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 
93 S. Ct. 2041, 361 F. 2d 854 (1973). The court recognizes 
that it is wrong to force rights upon an individual if he 
does not want their protection. Rights are afforded in-
dividuals to insure their protection. If such protections 
are not wanted, not needed, or possible detriments to an 
accused, he should have the unalterable right to say "I 
don't want that right." 
The following are some of the rights which have been 
held to be waivable. (1) Right to jury trial in criminal 
cases. Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 50 S. Ot. 
353 (1930). (2) Right against self-incrimination. Schmer-
ber v. State of California, 384 U. S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 
16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966). (3) Right to confront wit-
nesses. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 
25 L. Ed. 353 (1970). (4) Right to a speedy trial. Barker 
v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 
(1972). (5) Right to Counsel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 
407 U. S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972). 
(6) Search and Seizure protections. Katz v. United 
States, 389 U. S. 347, 88 S. Ot. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 
(1967). (7) Grand Jury indictment. Smith v. United 
States, 360 U. S. 1, 79 S. Ct. 991, 31 L. Ed. 2d 1041 (1959). 
These few cases are, of course, only a representative 
sample of the many waivable rights. An individual of 
normal competence and intelligence should have some 
power over determining his future. He had that right 
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when the crimes were committed. He should also have 
that right in relation to the consequences thereto. 
It is, therefore, submitted that public policy sup-
ports the view that an accused should be permitted to 
waive his right to jury trial. 
POINT II. 
THE APPELLANT SHOULD NOT BE PER-
MITTED TO CLAIM REVERSIBLE ERROR 
(IF ERROR THERE WAS) SINCE SUCH 
ERROR WAS INDUCED BY THE APPEL-
LANT AND WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
Utah, along with numerous other jurisdictions, limits 
the rights of appellants in what can and cannot be ap-
pealable errors. Such situations come into existence 
where defendants plead error to some facet of the trial 
which they induced the court to make and did not object 
or acquiesced to the decision made. This "after-the-fact" 
argument is exactly what appellant Maguire is making 
on this appeal. Simply stated, he is attempting to better 
his chances by claiming error to the ruling of the court 
which he asked the court to make. This "afterthought" 
approach claims "prejudice" when in fact no such preju-
dice existed. 
Appellant was charged with murder in the first de-
gree but was not found guilty of that offense. He was 
found guilty of murder in the second degree — a lesser 
offense — and received a lighter sentence than if he had 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
been convicted of the capital offense. The appellant 
claims this is "prejudice." Respondent cannot under-
stand how this conclusion is reached. It is not prejudicial 
for an accused to get a lighter sentence when, as in this 
case, the evidence is arguably strong enough to convince 
a jury that premeditated murder took place and that the 
appellant was guilty of that greater offense. The respon-
dent urges the Court to recognize this non-prejudicial 
decision of the court and not that claimed by the appel-
lant. 
A leading case of the United States Supreme Court 
in this area, Johnson v. United States, 318 U. S. 18, 63 
S. Ot. 549, 87 L. Ed. 704 (1943), held that the practice of 
claiming error on appeal from self-induced requests at 
trial cannot be sustained. The Court said: 
"We cannot permit an accused to elect to 
pursue one course at the trial and then, when 
that has proved to be unprofitable, to insist on 
appeal that the course which he rejected at the 
trial be reopened to him. However, unwise the 
first choice may have been, the range of waiver 
is wide. Since the protection which could have 
been obtained was plainly waived, the accused 
cannot now be heard to charge the court with 
depriving him of a fair trial. The court only fol-
lowed the course which he himself helped to chart 
and in which he acquiesced until the case was 
argued on appeal. The fact that the objection 
did not appear in the motion for new trial or in 
the assignments of error makes clear that the 
point now is a 'mere afterthought.'" 
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If a party adheres to a particular mode of strategy 
in open court and either misleads or joins in any error 
induced by his strategy, and does not raise or claim such 
error ait the time made, he should not be permitted to 
complain of unfairness by repudiating the course of trial 
he originally called for. Justice is not a system made 
up of accepted standards where parties can go back on 
their word — if you lose, repudiate your motions, agree-
ments, and acts — but one where procedures are estab-
lished to allow the orderly objection and handling of 
errors which do take place. (See also Peole v. Pijal, 33 
Cal. App, 3d 682, 109 Cal. Rptr. 230 (1973)). 
Whether the cases have been criminal or civil, the 
Utah Supreme Court has been quick to uphold the posi-
tion referred to above. In State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 
51 P. 1052 (1935), the court said: 
"We think the rule applicable that a party 
cannot successfully assign as error a ruling which 
he himself induced the court to make." 
This position was reaffirmed in the brief opinion of the 
court in State v. Fair, 28 Utah 2d 242, 501 P. 2d 107 
(1972), where the defendant's counsel chose to examine 
a witness outside of the presence of the jury and claimed 
on appeal that it was prejudicial error for the judge to 
have granted such motion. The court made clear that 
the error complained of was self-induced and that it 
would not be permitted to stand on appeal. The court 
said: 
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"Counsel chose not to do so, whether as a 
matter of strategy or otherwise — and it does 
not he in the mouth of defendant now to claim 
error having either wittingly or unwittingly in-
vited it" 
In the present situation, it is not totally clear why 
appellant Maguire wanted a trial without jury. Discus-
sions pertaining thereto are off the record and are guarded 
by the attorney-client privilege, but, whether the appel-
lant's separate counsel convinced him "wittingly or un-
wittingly" to move for such waiver is now of no concern. 
The fact is such motion was made, the judge was forced 
to rule, he did so, and the appellant accepted the ruling 
because it was what he desired. The appellant should 
not be allowed to now claim, as he looks back over his 
conviction, that prejudicial error of any magnitude took 
place. 
The Utah Supreme Court has spoken on this issue 
on many other occasions. Many of them, however, con-
cerned themselves with civil cases which do not have 
the same gravity of effect. The respondent submits, how-
ever, that the principles and law laid down in those cases 
apply just as well to the case at bar as to the situations 
under which the holdings were rendered. Ludlow v. Colo-
rado Animal By-Products Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 P. 2d 
347 (1943), held: 
"A party who takes a position which either 
leads a court into error or by conduct approves 
the error committed by the court, cannot later 
take advantage of such error in procedure." 
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Later, in Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 
P. 2d 185 (1954), the court expanded and reaffirmed 
what it had said many times before. The court said: 
"Furthermore, it is well established that a 
party cannot assign as error the giving of his 
own requests. He cannot lead the court into 
error and then be heard to complain thereof 
• • • 
Decisions from other jurisdictions supporting respon-
dent's position are voluminous. Some recent cases in 
support thereof are: People v. Delgado, 32 Gal. App. 3d 
242, 108 Cal. Aptr. 399 (1973), holding that a party is 
estopped from asserting error on appeal that was in-
duced by his own conduct. "He may not lead a judge into 
substantial error and then complain of it." (Emphasis 
added); Mack v. United States, 310 A. 2d 234 (D. C. 
App. 1973), holding that one cannot invite error and 
complain of prejudice; People v. Shackelford, 511 P. 2d 
19 (Colo. 1973), holding that the party who was the 
instrument of injecting error must abide by the conse-
quences of such error; People v. Miles, 13 111. App. 3d 
45, 300 N. E. 2d 822 (1973), which held that a defendant 
would not be permitted to argue an alleged error Where 
his counsel of record actually invited and affirmatively 
participated in the procedure which he now claimed as 
error. 
In the present case, Mr. Athay, counsel for appellant 
Maguire, communicated with the court regarding waiver 
of jury trial (R. 61-62). It becomes apparent from the 
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record that the appellant desired to waive the jury trial, 
and the counsel for the appellant explained his efforts 
of informing Mr. Maguire of his right to jury trial, after 
which the court went into detail regarding such rights 
and waiver. 
Simply because the appellant is represented by dif-
ferent counsel on appeal cannot mean that the appellant 
can now reject his and his former counsel's actions and 
motions before the trial judge. Certainly, the record 
points out that appellant Maguire led the trial court into 
allowing the waiver of jury trial. 
In light of the foregoing analysis and authority, as 
well as the clear implications and statements contained 
in the record, it is respectfully submitted that appellant 
Maguire cannot now claim injury for something he him-
self led the court to do. This is especially significant in 
light of the fact that no prejudice took place, for the 
entire history and record of his case contains no evidence 
of such. It is therefore, submitted that on this ground 
alone, the contentions of appellant Maguire should be 
rejected. 
POINT III. 
THE APPELLANT'S WAIVER OF JURY 
TRIAL WAS KNOWLEDGEABLY, COMPE-
TENTLY, AND INTELLIGENTLY MADE 
AND WAS NOT BASED ON ALLEGEDLY 
MISLEADING INSTRUCTIONS REGARD-
ING THE NUMBER OF JURORS. 
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The respondent adheres to the philosophy that the 
waiver of jury trial must be looked at with an eye focused 
on fairness and understanding. Respondent contends 
that the record clearly indicates that this was accom-
plished and that the appellant Maguire knowledgeably, 
competently and intelligently waived the jury trial and 
that such was done after serious deliberation on the 
part of appellant. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in Adams v. United 
States, 317 U. S. 269, 63 S. Ct. 236, 87 L. Ed. 268 (1942), 
that: 
". . . Whether or not there is an intelligent, 
competent, self-proteoting waiver of jury trial 
by an accused must depend upon the unique 
circumstances of each case." 
The "unique circumstances" of the present case sub-
stantiate the trial court's finding that the appellant prop-
erly waived his right. Mr. Athay told the court that the 
appellant discussed the matter "in detail" with him, that 
he as counsel believed the appellant understood the con-
sequences in full, and further that the defendant/appel-
lant answered Mr. Athay's question that he did so un-
derstand (R. 61). 
In State v. Thornton, 22 Utah 2d 140, 449 P. 2d 987 
(1969), this Court entertained an appeal regarding the 
effective waiver of the Miranda warning. The court found 
the dialogue between counsel and appellant sufficient 
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to sustain the finding of the court that the waiver was 
competently made. The court said: 
"After the confession had been introduced, 
counsel for defendant conducted a highly pro-
tracted intelligence test by question and an-
swer, and except for some answers noted out of 
context, defendant's testimony, in our opinion, 
did not detract from a conclusion that there was 
voluntariness of the confession. 
". . . the question must be resolved from ex-
amining the whole record, — which we have 
done in the insitant case . . ." 
The respondent contends that the court in the case 
at bar carried on such a "protracted intelligence test" 
to see what frame of mind, what knowledge, what desires 
and understanding the appellant had for the waiver to 
be valid . Judges must act with v^hat they have available. 
They are given power to accept waivers. This power and 
authority is a mere folly if every time such a waiver is 
effectuated one can claim incompetence for such waiver. 
Counsel is provided to help eliminate such conduct. Here, 
the court made its decision and that upon which the 
appellant bases his appeal is not shown to have influ-
enced his decision. There is no evidence showing the 
trial judge erred in ascertaining a valid waiver. 
The second time Mr. Athay spoke — immediately 
after all parties said they were ready, he moved the court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2 (1953), that the 
jury be waived (R. 61). Thus, it is apparent that even 
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before the judge mentioned the jury or his interpretation 
that eight jurors would be the number chosen, the ap-
pellant moved to waive it. Obviously, some consideration 
had been given to the subject of waiver before coming 
to court as substantiated by Mr. Athay's own words (R. 
61). Therefore, the two or three times that the court 
said "eight jurors" was not paramount or decisive to the 
decision that was made. 
In James, the error was carried to completion with 
the eight man jury sitting instead of the twelve man 
jury. As such, active error was continuous. In the pres-
ent case, however, the major issue is "a jury or no jury." 
The fact that no jury was chosen as the alternative and 
that the defendant wanted the judge to hear the case 
should carry sufficient weight in light of the fact that 
the appellant decided on waiver before the false instruc-
tion. To sustain the finding that the mere mention of 
eight jurors was error is a misinterpretation of justice. 
There is no indication of reliance on the instruction, as 
well as no indication that the defendant was thinking 
anything different. 
Because of this reasoning coupled with the fact that 
before the defense began its part of the trial the court 
ruled out the capital nature of the crime by reducing to 
voluntary manslaughter or murder in the second degree 
the crime under consideration, no prejudice or injury 
came to the appellant. At all times he was benefited by 
these rulings. First, he knew the death penalty would 
not be applied. Second, the capital nature of the offense 
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was dismissed. Third, the court went along with his 
wishes regarding the jury. 
The appellant had ample opportunity to question 
and challenge the instruction but did not do so. No ex-
ception was taken, and no indication exists that the in-
struction played any role in the appellant's decision to 
waive jury trial. Thus, no prejudicial error took place 
which would warrant the reversal or remand of the pres-
ent case. 
Respondent therefore submits that if any error did 
exist, it was not prejudicial. Since there exists ample 
evidence to distinguish this case from that of James as 
well as the fact that no prejudice existed it is requested 
that this court find that the appellant's waiver was 
knowingly, competently, and intelligently made. 
POINT IV. 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUB-
STANTIATE THE TRIAL COURT'S FIND-
ING OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER 
Appellant alleges that insufficient evidence exists 
to support his conviction. This court has periodically 
reaffirmed standards for reviewing evidence which the 
respondent feels are controlling. As early as State v. 
Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 P. 255 (1929), this Court said: 
". . . As we view the testimony, the conten-
tion made that the evidence is insufficient to 
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justify the verdict is wholly untenable. This 
court, on appeal from conviction, cannot weigh 
the evidence, and has held in effect that in the 
absence of legislation to the contrary, the appel-
late court has no right to say what quantum of 
evidence shall be necessary to establish a given 
fact or set of facts, so long as there is substan-
tial evidence in support of such fact or facts," 
(Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.) 
Several years later this "substantial evidence" test 
was affirmed as it related to a jury verdict. The court 
did, however, expound on the application of the test. In 
State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P. 2d 865 (1959), the 
court held: 
"The rules governing the scope of review on 
appeal as to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain the verdict are well settled; that it is the 
prerogative of the jury to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses and to determine the facts; that 
the evidence will be reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict; and that if when so 
viewed it appears that the jury acting fairly 
and reasonably could find the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not 
be disturbed." 
Just recently, this court once again made plain that only 
When there is no reasonable basis for the conclusion of 
guilt would a verdict be overturned. The statement in 
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P. 2d 246 (1970), is 
as follows: 
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"Unless upon our review of the evidence, 
and the reasonable inferences fairly to be de-
duced therefrom, it appears that there is no 
reasonable basis therein for such a conclusion, 
we should not overturn the verdict." (Cita-
tions omitted.) 
Is there in the facts presented below a "reasonable 
basis" upon which the judge could convict? The appel-
lant contends that the malice aforethought required for 
murder in the second degree was not or could not be 
proven and offered as sole evidence the testimony of the 
accused — to say the least self-serving testimony. A 
closer look at the totality of the facts indicates with 
profound meaning that the judge or a jury could find 
and actually did find all requisites needed for the con-
viction of appellant. 
The testimony given at trial did bear out that the 
victim had a known disposition for violence. Further, 
it was confirmed that he owed the appellant money and 
that on the evening of the homicide he had been the 
instigator of an argument at his wife's motel room. 
Many other facts were introduced which would lead 
one to believe that more than a fit of passion caused the 
death of the victim. First, when the appellant testified 
that he was offered a ride, he also testified that the victim 
did not want the gun in the car and yet the appellant 
went to his own vehicle, got the gun and took it back 
to the victim's car (R. 256-258). Second, at the motel 
room the victim's wife testified that the victim said that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
the appellant had a .38 but that the appellant wasn't 
going to scare him with it. This took place alter the ar-
gument between the appellant and Mr. Petersen and in-
dicates that something had been said about the gun 
during the argument (R. 188). 
Third, Dr. Taylor testified that two bullets were 
shot in the head of the victim, one from the front and 
one from the back (R. 137). All testimony of the appel-
lant indicated two shots, but that the first went off when 
they were struggling for the gun which, according to 
appellant's testimony, did not hit anyone, and the sec-
ond shot went in the forehead of the victim at which time 
the victim collapsed forward and was dead (R. 263, 35 
seq.) Dr. Taylor indicated that one bullet traveled down 
into the skull and the other upward (R. 138) which 
would indicate different positions. He further testified 
that he could not tell which one was fired first or which 
bullet caused death. The respondent claims that this 
evidence alone is sufficient to warrant a finding that 
the appellant wanted the victim dead. Dr. Taylor testi-
fied that either bullet would have caused instant uncon-
sciousness. Further, all evidence substantiates that the 
shots were fired from different locations, thus the reason 
for the angle dhanges as well as the points of entry. Such 
evidence refutes the theory that it was not intended. 
Further, in order for the victim to get the gun (which 
he did not want in the car in the first place) he would 
have had to reach across the car, in front of the appellant, 
undo the glove compartment and remove the gun. All 
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this was examined on direct and cross, and the appellant 
said he could not recall what happened at that instant 
(R. 315). 
Next, the appellant testified that he had scratches 
on his arm from the struggle over the gun. He did say, 
however, that the victim's left hand was useless being 
trapped on the outside of the steering wheel when he 
went for the gun (R. 365). If this is so, how could the 
arm have been scratched? The appellant denied receiv-
ing the scratches in moving the body out of the car. 
Testimony further indicates that the appellant in 
all previous encounbers with the victim had retreated 
when arguments took place between them, but on this 
occasion he refused to move or retreat and took the 
offensive in grabbing for the gun (R. 319-320). The ap-
pellant further admitted that he knew the deceased had 
lived with his wife while the appellant was in prison (R. 
288) and that he could have made threats against the 
victim (R. 289). 
Based on the foregoing analysis of the facts and the 
questionable areas raised, it becomes apparent that suf-
ficient evidence exists to establish the "beyond a reason-
able doubt" requirement needed for the finding of malice 
aforethought. The court correctly found that the unlaw-
ful killing was murder in the second degree. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent therefore submits that the trial court 
did not err in allowing waiver of the jury and in no event 
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was such a waiver prejudicial. The appellant further 
waived the jury through intelligent, methodical, and 
knowledgeable means and did not rely on the purported 
error of instruction. Finally, the evidence contained 
through testimony at trial substantiates that the trial 
court was correct in its finding that the appellant was 
guilty of murder in the second degree. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
M. REID RUSSELL 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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